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Over the past decade, social scientists have devoted a considerable amount of effort to 
identifying the effect of neighborhood-level factors on individual outcomes.  In response to the 
traditional concern regarding families’ endogenous choice of neighborhoods, researchers have 
adopted an array of techniques, including simple bounds analyses (Solon, Page and Duncan 
2000; Page and Solon 2003), propensity score matching methods (Harding 2003), instrumental 
variables (Cutler and Glaeser 1997), quasi- or “natural” experiments (Aaronson 1998; 
Oreopoulos 2003; Jacob 2004), and actual randomized controlled trials (Kling and Liebman 
2004; see Vigdor 2006 for a review of recent literature on neighborhood effects).  From a 
scientific perspective, it would be comforting to find a consensus on the direction and magnitude 
of neighborhood effects.  No such consensus exists.  A review of the recent literature finds 
considerable heterogeneity in conclusions.  While a careful reader could certainly find flaws in 
even the most carefully conducted studies to date, a reasonable implication to take from existing 
literature is that neighborhood effects are not monolithic in nature: the relationship between 
neighborhood characteristics and individual outcomes depends on characteristics both of the 
context and of the individual.
Among the most prominent neighborhood characteristics examined in existing literature 
is racial or ethnic concentration, often as proxied by a segregation index.  Cutler and Glaeser 
(1997) find significant negative relationships between segregation and outcomes for African-
Americans in 1990.  Subsequent research on segregation and outcomes has found either no 
association or a reversed relationship, using earlier data on African-Americans (Collins and 
Margo 2000) or quasi-experimental evidence on immigrants in Sweden (Edin, Fredriksson and 
1Aslund, 2003).  A fair reading of existing evidence, then, suggests that ghettos may be either 
good or bad for outcomes.
What determines whether segregation has a positive or negative impact on outcomes? 
This paper seeks insight into this question by examining the experiences of immigrant groups in 
the United States, utilizing newly computed segregation indices for immigrants of roughly 100 
different nationalities living in any of roughly 300 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).  To 
address the important concern that immigrants sort themselves into enclaves nonrandomly, we 
employ two basic strategies.  The first involves the use of both country-of-origin and MSA fixed 
effects.  In these specifications, we identify the impact of segregation by comparing groups that 
are more and less segregated within a city, relative to their own group-level averages.  Second, 
we conduct an instrumental variables analysis.  Our instrument for segregation is the mean 
number of years since immigration for group members in a particular MSA.  More recently 
arrived groups tend to be less segregated.  We control directly for an individual’s years since 
immigration, which should directly capture any assimilation effects.  We also control for average 
group age and education level in the second stage regression.
1
Existing literature can be divided into papers directly examining the effects of ethnic 
concentration in one’s neighborhood, and to those that concentrate on the effect of average 
concentration in one’s MSA.  In this paper, we perform both types of analysis.  To conduct the 
second analysis, we make use of restricted-access Census microdata, employing control 
strategies similar to those used in the first analysis.  Our instrument for neighborhood 
concentration is an imputed variable, equal to the concentration level predicted on the basis of 
1 As discussed below, if we violate the exclusion restriction in spite of these efforts, the expected impact is to bias 
the results of the IV regressions towards OLS.  Results will reveal significant differences between OLS and IV 
specifications.
2the distribution of individuals by occupation across tracts in an MSA, and for the observed 
national occupation distribution of the group in question.
Our results point towards a relationship between segregation and outcomes that 
corroborates some earlier findings: segregation tends to have more beneficial effects for groups 
with higher levels of average human capital (Edin, Fredriksson and Aslund, 2003; Cutler, 
Glaeser and Vigdor 2005a).  We also find notable differences between the estimated impact of 
segregation and the impact of neighborhood concentration.  In many cases, the average effect of 
segregation on outcomes is positive, while the effect of neighborhood concentration is negative. 
Together, the results imply that residence near, but not in, an enclave can be beneficial to a 
certain class of immigrant, perhaps professionals or entrepreneurs who serve the community.
While our motivation to study immigrant ghettos in the United States clearly relates to a 
desire to understand the mechanisms underlying ethnic and racial concentration effects more 
generally, we should also note that there is a compelling specific reason to study this population 
at this time.  As Figure 1 indicates, immigrant segregation has been rising in the United States 
since the mid-twentieth century.  Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (2005b) show that only a small 
portion of this increase can be attributed to changing characteristics of immigrants themselves; a 
larger portion relates to the changing form of American cities and the tendency for immigrants to 
participate less fully in the process of suburban sprawl.  Rising segregation need not be a public 
policy concern if segregation has few or no negative consequences.  Results presented here 
suggest that at least in some cases, such a sanguine view is not warranted.
Section 2 discusses the potential benefits and costs of ethnic concentration.  Section 3 
reviews our sources of data and methods.  Section 4 presents results, and section 5 concludes.
32. How might ghettos impact immigrants?
Arguments and theoretical models considering the potential impacts of segregation can be 
found in the existing literature (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Borjas, 1998; Edin, Fredriksson and 
Aslund, 2003).  In this section, we briefly review the hypothesized benefits and costs of enclave 
residence.
2.1 The benefits of segregation
Residence in an enclave community might have beneficial impacts on immigrant’s 
income and consumption possibilities.  Ethnic density may foster the formation of group-specific 
networks that provide access to employment opportunities and transportation.  Residential 
concentration may also be necessary for groups to form a critical mass necessary to support 
group-specific commercial enterprises or community institutions (Waldfogel, 2003).  Generally 
speaking, the benefits associated with segregation can be thought of as reducing the costs of 
assimilation to the host society, primarily by making that process less necessary to economic 
success.
2.2 The costs of segregation
While many of the benefits associated with residence in an enclave are immediate in 
nature, many of the hypothesized costs accrue over a longer period of time.  Enclave 
communities are often located in older residential areas, further from suburban areas of job 
growth in most MSAs.  Thus, while the availability of employment and transportation networks 
may assist immigrants in the short run, the relative difficulty of expanding beyond these 
4networks could cause harm in the long run.  This hypothesized impact relates to the spatial 
mismatch hypothesis (Kain 1968), long discussed as a possible mechanism linking racial 
segregation to poor labor market outcomes for African-Americans.
Because of their tendency to be located in older neighborhoods, ethnic enclaves are 
disproportionately likely to be served by relatively strained central city or inner-ring suburb 
governments.  Lower quality of local public goods, particularly primary and secondary 
education, may have a strong negative impact on family welfare, albeit one only observed with a 
significant time lag.  Other local disamenities, such as crime, may impact immigrants more 
immediately.  Cutler, Glaser and Vigdor (2005b) show evidence that the availability of one 
locally-provided public good, transit, may play a disproportionate role in immigrant location 
decisions.  To the extent that investments in transit crowd out other categories of public 
expenditure, enclave residents may suffer in the long run.
Beyond these costs associated with physical location of the ghetto, isolated immigrants 
may more generally exhibit reduced rates of economic and cultural assimilation.  Exposed 
disproportionately to people like themselves, group members may retain group characteristics for 
a longer period of time.  For less-educated or lower-skilled immigrant groups, this implies lower 
future income for present and future generations.  For higher-skilled groups, of course, isolation 
from the less-skilled majority may actually be beneficial.  The impact of segregation on human 
capital accumulation quite possibly depends on the characteristics of the segregated group 
(Borjas 1998; Edin, Fredriksson and Aslund 2003; Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 2005a).
Given the presence of short-term benefits and longer-term costs, an immigrant’s optimal 
strategy may be to locate in an enclave community initially, then move out once a certain amount 
5of assimilation has taken place.  Indeed, empirical evidence supports the notion that immigrants 
tend to reduce their degree of isolation as they spend more time in the host country (Cutler, 
Glaeser and Vigdor 2005b, see also the first-stage regressions in Appendix Table A1).  The 
selection of more-assimilated immigrants out of enclave communities poses a direct challenge to 
any efforts to estimate the relationship between segregation and outcomes.  Immigrants living in 
isolated settings possess observable characteristics associated with more negative socioeconomic 
outcomes, it is reasonable to presume that these immigrants possess unfavorable unobserved 
characteristics as well.  In general, then, we expect simple estimates of the relationship between 
segregation and outcomes to be biased downwards.  Our strategies for circumventing this bias 
are detailed in the following section.
3. Data and Methods
3.1 Basic information
Our study of immigrant segregation and outcomes makes use of information collected in 
the US Decennial Census enumeration of 1990.
2  The Census contains information on country of 
birth for all foreign-born residents; we use this information to categorize immigrants by country 
of origin.
3  Socioeconomic outcome measures derived from the Census include the logarithm of 
earned income in 1989, indicators for whether an individual was either gainfully employed or 
enrolled in school in the week prior to the enumeration, and whether a female was a single 
2 We use 1990 data here primarily for purposes of comparability with Cutler and Glaeser (1997).  Analyses 
completed with 2000 Census data, available from the authors on request, show similar patterns to those 
presented here.
3 The Census does not collect information on citizenship for foreign-born residents.  There is some concern that 
the Census severely undercounts immigrants, particularly undocumented or “illegal” immigrants.  We imagine 
that undocumented immigrants have relatively poor socioeconomic outcomes and have a disproportionate 
tendency to locate in immigrant enclaves.  Thus, excluding these individuals from our sample should have the 
impact of reducing any estimated negative relationship between locations and outcomes. We hesitate to refer to 
our coefficients as biased, however, since much of the change in coefficients associated with including 
undocumented immigrants would doubtlessly represent selection bias rather than any true treatment effect.
6mother.  These outcome variables mirror those used in Cutler and Glaeser (1997).  As in that 
earlier paper, we restrict our attention to individuals between 20 and 30 years of age at the time 
of the enumeration, under the hypothesis that this group is more likely to have their residential 
location assigned by parental choice, rather than their own individual choice.  This is not our 
only effort to address possible selection biases; our other efforts are described in more detail 
below.
In addition to these outcome measures, we examine three variables pertaining to younger 
immigrants.  For children between the ages of 9 and 18, we analyze the probability of both 
speaking and writing English well.  For children between 16 and 18 years of age, we consider the 
decision to enroll in school.  Finally, for females 13 to 19 years old, we analyze the propensity to 
be a teenage mother.  Summary statistics for these outcome variables and for the individual-level 
covariates controlled for in our analysis appear in Table 1.
3.2 Measuring segregation and ethnic concentration
There are many ways to measure segregation and ethnic concentration, and social 
scientists continue to find new, and arguably superior, ways to quantify both constructs (Massey 
and Denton 1988; Echenique and Fryer 2005).  Our analysis makes use of two segregation 
indices, both of which are described in detail in Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999).  The 
dissimilarity index, D,  is defined as:
(1)  D=1
2∑
i ∣
groupi
grouptotal
−non−
groupi
non
−grouptotal∣
where groupi denotes the number of relevant immigrant group members living in neighborhood i, 
grouptotal the number living in the entire city or metropolitan area, and non-groupi and non-
7grouptotal are similarly defined for residents not belonging to the group in question.  Dissimilarity 
equals zero in situations where a group forms an equal share of the population in all 
neighborhoods, and equals one when a group resides exclusively in neighborhoods where no 
non-group members live.  Between these extremes, the dissimilarity index can be interpreted as 
the share of group members (or non-group members) that would have to switch neighborhoods in 
order to achieve an even distribution across the MSA.
While it possesses an intuitive interpretation, the dissimilarity index can easily be 
criticized (see, for example, Echenique and Fryer 2005).  Among other criticisms, the 
dissimilarity index can record a group as being highly segregated even in situations where group 
members have extensive neighborhood-level exposure to non-group members.  A group located 
exclusively in one neighborhood that only forms 10% of the population in that neighborhood, for 
example, would have a dissimilarity value close to one in a large MSA.  While many alternative 
indices have been proposed that lack this undesirable property, our past work (Cutler, Glaeser 
and Vigdor 1999) focuses on one in particular, the isolation index.  Isolation is defined as 
follows:
(2) I=
∑
i
groupi
grouptotal
×
groupi
populationi
−
grouptotal
populationtotal
min1,
grouptotal
populationsmallest
−
grouptotal
populationtotal
where groupi and grouptotal are defined as above, populationi and populationtotal represent the 
overall population in tract i and the entire city or metropolitan area, and populationsmallest is the 
population of the neighborhood with the fewest residents in the city or metropolitan area.  At the 
extremes, isolation and dissimilarity take on the same values, zero and one.  At intermediate 
8values, isolation measures the extent to which the neighborhood-level group share experienced 
by the average group member exceeds the level that would be expected under perfect integration.
Either segregation index requires us to operationalize the concept of neighborhood.  We 
compute segregation using Census tracts, which average 4,000 residents each though population 
size varies.  Arguments can be made for using either larger or smaller geographic areas as the 
unit of analysis; tracts have the advantage that they are defined consistently throughout the 
country and have a rich array of demographic data available for analysis in public use summary 
files.
Figure 1 displays the time pattern of immigrant segregation since 1910, using the two 
indices defined above.  The plotted values are averages of immigrant group/city specific 
observations, weighted by the number of group members in the city in the indicated year.  Both 
dissimilarity and isolation have been rising over the past several decades, though the 1990s 
witnessed relative stability in dissimilarity levels.  Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (2005b) analyze 
the time series and cross-sectional variation in immigrant segregation over this time period. 
Summary statistics for immigrant segregation indices used in the analysis below appear in Table 
1.
Segregation indices can be considered a measure of the average degree of neighborhood 
concentration experienced by a group member in a particular MSA.  The use of this proxy 
measure instead of actual neighborhood-level exposure can be justified on two grounds, one 
pratical and the other statistical.  First, there are very few datasets that provide microdata on 
individual outcomes coupled with neighborhood-level geographic identifiers.  Segregation 
indices serve as an imperfect proxy measure for this neighborhood-level information, capturing 
9the actual neighborhood concentration of each resident with some degree of error.  If these 
measurement errors are uncorrelated with individual characteristics, no bias should be introduced 
into the analysis.  
Of course, the decision to locate in a segregated or integrated environment within a 
metropolitan area is almost certainly related to a host of individual characteristics.  This simple 
fact provides the second rationale for using MSA-level segregation indices as a proxy for 
neighborhood-level concentration: endogeneity problems are likely to be more severe when 
using finer geographic detail.  It is easier to argue that individuals choose an MSA without 
regard to the degree of segregation than to say that they choose a neighborhood without regard to 
racial or ethnic composition.
In section 4.2 below, we present an analysis of the relationship between neighborhood-
level ethnic exposure and socioeconomic outcomes for immigrants.  This analysis makes use of 
restricted-access Census microdata, which combine the same set of individual demographic and 
socioeconomic information available in public use microdata samples with finer geographic 
identification.  The following section describes our efforts to address selection bias in this 
analysis and the more general study of immigrant segregation and outcomes.
3.3 Addressing selection bias
Estimates of the impact of ethnic concentration on socioeconomic outcomes will be 
biased to the extent that individuals with unobservably inferior (or superior) characteristics sort 
into more (or less) concentrated neighborhoods, or to MSAs with higher (or lower) average 
levels of neighborhood concentration.  Previous literature has sought to address this bias in a 
10number of ways, including the analysis of actual randomized neighborhood assignment trials and 
the use of quasi- or natural experiments.  The estimates we present below adopt a series of 
strategies to infer the impact of selection bias on the results.
First, we present results that incorporate both MSA and country-of-origin fixed effects. 
With these fixed effects in place, our effects of interest are identified from variation in the extent 
of segregation for immigrant groups residing in the same city, except for that variation that stems 
from differences in the average segregation level across groups.  These fixed effects eliminate 
many potential sources of bias.  For example, one common concern is that segregation tends to 
be higher in older MSAs with a heavier reliance on manufacturing industry, public transit, and 
the like.  These characteristics may in turn predict worse (or better) outcomes for immigrants. 
Fixed effects eliminate this concern.  A second example would be a concern that a particularly 
uneducated immigrant group shows a tendency to form residential enclaves wherever they 
locate, and its members experience poor outcomes regardless of the actual segregation level. 
This concern is also addressed with the fixed effects strategy.
The fixed-effects strategy is certainly not flawless.  If immigrants with unobserved skill 
levels lower than their group-level average tend to sort into ethnically concentrated 
environments, wherever they may be, then selection bias will still influence our estimates.  Thus, 
while we believe the fixed effects strategy addresses many selection concerns, it does not address 
all of them.  Evidence that estimates with and without fixed effects are substantially similar 
would bolster our confidence that selection bias is a relatively minor concern.
To further address selection bias issues, we employ instrumental variable (IV) strategies 
in specifications examining both MSA-level segregation and tract-level ethnic concentration.  A 
11successful IV research design involves one or more variables that influence segregation but have 
no other statistical relationship, causal or otherwise, with the dependent variable.  In 
specifications examining segregation indices, we instrument for segregation with a measure of 
the mean years since immigration for members of a country-of-origin group within a city.  There 
are two primary concerns regarding the exclusion restriction for these models.  First, years since 
immigration can be considered a measure of assimilation, which could directly impact outcomes. 
To address this, we control separately in the regression for an individual immigrant’s own years 
since immigration.  A second concern is that employers or other agents may statistically 
discriminate against members of a group on the basis of average group characteristics, including 
years since immigration.  To address this concern, we control directly for two other city/group 
level characteristics that are arguably more likely to inspire statistical discrimination: average 
age and average education levels.  Age is more directly observable than years since immigration, 
and education is a more reliable predictor of an individual's skill level.  Representative first stage 
regression specifications are reported in Appendix Table A1.  Immigrant groups tend to be 
significantly less segregated as they spend more time in the United States.
4
In our tract-level ethnic concentration specifications, we instrument for concentration 
with a simulated measure that takes the total number of group members in an MSA, the 
distribution of non-group members, the nationwide distribution of occupations for each group, 
and the MSA-specific distribution of individuals by occupation across tracts as given.  A 
predicted concentration level is computed for each group in each tract according to the following 
4  One might still maintain that the group’s average years since immigration correlates with some unobserved 
individual characteristic.  The most likely scenario, arguably, is that immigrants belonging to groups with more 
years since immigration are unobservably more assimilated, and should hence have more positive economic 
outcomes. In this scenario, the IV results would reflect a bias toward the OLS results, as its central implication – 
that residents of less segregated communities are unobservably predisposed to superior outcomes – is identical to 
the fundamental concern regarding OLS.
12formula:
(3) Predicted group size = pijRiOj
where Predicted group size is a t by 1 vector of the simulated number of group members in tracts 
indexed t, pij is a (scalar) measure of group j’s population in MSA i, Ri is a t by k matrix listing 
the share of persons with occupation k residing within each of the t tracts, and Oj is a k by 1 
vector of the distribution of group j members across the k occupations.  The predicted tract share 
is then computed by dividing predicted group size by the sum of predicted group size and the 
actual number of non-group members in the tract.  Table A1 lists representative first stage 
regression specifications utilizing this instrument; in general it is a very strong predictor of actual 
group share.  Immigrants tend to locate in neighborhoods that house individuals of similar skill 
levels.
4. Results
4.1 The impact of segregation
Tables 2A and 2B present sets of ordinary least squares regression results examining the 
relationship between segregation and outcomes for first-generation immigrants in the United 
States in 1990.  Table 2A uses the dissimilarity index as a segregation measure, and table 2B 
focuses on the isolation index.  Samples are restricted to individuals in the age ranges specified 
at the head of each column; males and females are included in all specifications except those for 
single and teen motherhood, which focus on females only.
Using either segregation index as the independent variable of interest, coefficients across 
specifications are generally small and equally likely to be of a sign associated with positive or 
13negative impacts of segregation.  The sole exception, in both tables, is the specification 
examining the logarithm of earned income in the previous year.  Both dissimilarity and isolation 
have a statistically significant positive association with this outcome.  The magnitude of the 
estimated effects is sizable; a one-standard deviation increase in dissimilarity, for example, 
predicts a 15% increase in earned income.
Coefficients on several other control variables merit at least some discussion here.  Each 
specification in both tables controls separately for a group’s share of the population, since that 
variable correlates with segregation and may have independent effects on outcomes (Cutler, 
Glaeser and Vigdor 2005b).  In these specifications, group share correlates negatively with youth 
outcomes such as English language ability and school enrollment, with statistically significant 
coefficients in three out of four cases.  Group share associates positively with earned income.
Immigrants who have spent more time in the United States, other things equal, experience 
superior labor market and schooling-related outcomes.  This could reflect either the impact of 
assimilation or the tendency for immigrants with worse labor market outcomes to leave the 
country.  Outcomes for childbearing-related outcomes do not follow this pattern, which may 
indicate age effects that are not properly reflected in our linear control, but might also indicate 
assimilation of another form: towards American-style rates of single and teen motherhood.
Other individual characteristics have generally predictable effects on these outcomes. 
Higher education levels are associated with better socioeconomic outcomes.  Controlling 
categorically for year of entry, older immigrants (i.e. those who entered the US at a later age) 
have worse outcomes along a number of dimensions, with the exception of earnings – returns to 
age in the immigrant population appear to be quite strong.  We estimate significant gaps in labor 
14market outcomes for females and immigrants identifying themselves with a racial category other 
than white.
Average characteristics of an immigrant’s fellow group members living in the same MSA 
show up as significant predictors of most outcomes.  Immigrants belonging to older groups fare 
better on educational outcomes but worse in the labor market.  Given that this analysis focuses 
on younger first-generation immigrants, higher average ages might represent a higher proportion 
of these individuals’ parents residing in the same MSA.  Parents might encourage their children 
to receive more education.  Parent-generation immigrants, who presumably are less likely to be 
employed in entry-level jobs, may be less beneficial when it comes to providing employment 
connections.
Immigrants belonging to more educated groups fare better on all outcomes.  These effects 
may represent true “ethnic capital” type mechanisms (Borjas, 1995), or might simply reflect a 
correlation between unobserved individual characteristics and group average characteristics.
Aside from incorporating a few individual- and group-level covariates, the specifications 
in Table 2A and 2B do very little to address concerns of endogenous immigrant sorting into 
enclave environments.  Tables 3A and 3B take a further step in this regard, presenting 
coefficients from specifications that incorporate MSA and country-of-origin specific fixed 
effects.  As in the previous two tables, there are generally few significant links between 
segregation, as measured by either dissimilarity or isolation, and the set of outcomes under 
consideration.  Of the three coefficients appearing significantly, two imply that segregation has 
beneficial effects: dissimilarity predicts lower levels of idleness, and isolation predicts greater 
English proficiency.
15Perhaps most notably, the one significant association found in the earlier tables, between 
segregation and earned income, is no longer present in these specifications.  The apparent 
tendency for immigrants to earn more when more segregated can be explained by patterns of 
higher earnings in generally more segregated cities, or by a tendency for immigrant groups prone 
to segregation to earn more.  Within cities and within groups, estimated effects are reduced 
substantially in the case of isolation, and appear with an opposite sign (and marginal statistical 
significance) in the case of dissimilarity.  This pattern indicates the existence of a positive bias in 
OLS estimates: immigrants with more favorable unobserved characteristics belong to groups that 
tend to be universally more segregated, or reside in cities where immigrant segregation tends to 
be higher.
The addition of MSA and country-of-origin fixed effects also reduces the magnitude and 
significance of virtually every coefficient on group average characteristics.  Of the 24 group 
average characteristics coefficients appearing in Tables 2A and 2B, 20 attained some degree of 
statistical significance at conventional levels.  Comparing Tables 3A and 3B, 23 of these 24 
coefficients have either moved towards zero or reversed signs.  Of the six coefficients that retain 
significance after the addition of fixed effects, four have the opposite sign relative to the original 
coefficient in Table 2A or 2B.  The general effect of group-level education on outcomes 
continues to be positive in most cases.  Group-level mean age now appears to have a modest, yet 
statistically significant, negative impact on English-speaking ability and an adverse impact on 
teen motherhood.  For the most part, though, across-group differences in average characteristics 
appear to associate much more strongly with individual outcomes than within-group, across-city 
differences in average characteristics.  This increases our confidence that our instrumental 
16variable strategy, which exploits the strong association between a group-level characteristic and 
segregation levels, satisfies the exclusion restriction – that the group-level characteristic has no 
other association with the outcomes in question.
Instrumental variable estimates of the mean impact of segregation on outcomes appear in 
Tables 4A and 4B.  These specifications continue to control for MSA and country-of-origin fixed 
effects, as in Tables 3A and 3B.  Coefficients from representative first-stage regression 
specifications can be found in Appendix Table A1.  While the selection concerns enunciated in 
section 3.3 above tended to presume a pattern of negative selection into enclave environments, 
the preceding results indicate that the bias may work in the other direction as well: segregated 
immigrant communities may attract either disproportionately skilled or unskilled immigrants.  
Comparing results in Tables 4A and 4B with their OLS counterparts in Tables 3A and 3B 
reveals that IV coefficients are more positive (or closer to positive) in eleven of twelve cases. 
This pattern is a bit less conclusive than it might at first appear, as three of the dependent 
variables are scaled in such a way that positive values are associated with negative outcomes – 
being a teen or single mother, or being idle.  From this perspective, it is unclear what type of 
selection into segregated communities predominates.  It should also be noted, however, that in 
four of the five cases where coefficient differences point toward positive selection, both OLS and 
IV coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero.  On net, the stronger evidence 
supports the selection of less-skilled individuals into enclave communities.
The four significant coefficients on segregation indices in tables 4A and 4B are found in 
specifications examining two dependent variables: the English ability of young first-generation 
immigrants and the logarithm of earnings for young adults.  Both of these dependent variables 
17had shown at least some evidence of a relationship with segregation in prior specifications.  The 
magnitudes associated with these coefficients are generally reasonable: a one-standard deviation 
increase in isolation predicts a 1.7 percentage point increase in the probability of speaking and 
writing English, and a 5.4% increase in earned income.  Overall, the IV results suggest that 
immigrant ghettos are beneficial, improving the economic outcomes of immigrants while 
actually accelerating the assimilation of immigrant children.  Residential concentration may 
improve language acquisition for foreign-born children by fostering the development of 
specialized curricular programs in local public schools.  Two important questions remain, 
however.  Are ghettos equally benign for all immigrant groups?  Does the analysis of segregation 
and outcomes really give us an accurate portrait of the true impact of living in a concentrated 
ethnic enclave?  The remainder of this section addresses these two questions.
4.2 The impact of neighborhood-level group share
The primary practical obstacle to the direct analysis of the effects of neighborhood ethnic 
concentration on socioeconomic outcomes is the lack of microdata with sufficient geographic 
detail to link individuals to neighborhoods.  This obstacle can be surmounted with restricted-
access Census microdata made available by the Census Bureau through its Regional Data Center 
program.  Table 5 presents an analysis using these data, relating the neighborhood-level ethnic 
concentration experienced by foreign-born residents of the United States to a series of 
educational and labor market outcomes.
5  These specifications employ both metropolitan area 
and country-of-origin fixed effects, and are thus most comparable to the segregation index-based 
5 Fertility-related outcomes are not included in this analysis, primarily because our initial application to use the 
RDC restricted-access household dataset did not explicitly mention these outcomes.  Census Bureau 
confidentiality rules also prohibit the disclosure of results utilizing cell sizes below a specific value.
18estimates presented in Tables 3A and 3B.
In each reported specification, the share of a respondent's Census tract belonging to the 
same country-of-origin group appears as a significant predictor of labor market and educational 
outcomes.  In three of four cases, the estimated effect is adverse.  Young adult immigrants 
residing in more concentrated neighborhoods are more likely to be idle, and report lower 
earnings.  Immigrant children residing in such neighborhoods are less likely to speak and read 
English proficiently, but more likely to be enrolled in school at ages 16 through 18.  Each of 
these results holds controlling for the same set of individual- and group-level covariates used in 
earlier specifications.
The strength of these results represents a marked contrast with the generally inconclusive 
patterns observed in Tables 3A and 3B.  In only one instance does a significant tract share 
coefficient in Table 5 coincide with a significant segregation index coefficient in the earlier 
tables: dissimilarity was estimated to have a moderately significant negative impact on earnings 
in Table 3A.  This lack of concordance sounds a cautionary note for studies employing 
segregation indices as explanatory variables in studies of socioeconomic outcomes: while these 
indices serve as summary statistics for neighborhood-level indicators, they generally do a poor 
job of replicating the results obtained with true neighborhood-level data.
There are serious threats to causal interpretation of the coefficient estimates in Table 5. 
While these regressions control for a number of individual characteristics, as well as MSA and 
group fixed effects, individual sorting on unobservables into neighborhoods with varying ethnic 
concentration could still produce inconsistency here.  In Table 6, we provide instrumental 
variable estimates that essentially exploit the tendency for American metropolitan areas to be 
19economically segregated, and for immigrant groups to form an unrepresentative socioeconomic 
sample of the broader population.
Instrumental variable estimates continue to show strong, statistically significant 
associations between tract share and the English ability of child immigrants, and between tract 
share and the earnings of young adult immigrants.  A ten percentage point increase in share 
predicts a 1 percentage point decrease in the probability of English fluency, and a 2.7% reduction 
in earnings.  In the other two specifications, the statistical significance realized in OLS estimates 
is eliminated.  Comparison of OLS and IV estimates provides no uniform signal regarding the 
direction of bias in OLS.  Effects appear less favorable in three out of four specifications, with 
the exception being idleness: a significant association in OLS is replaced with an insignificant 
relationship in the IV model.  The preponderance of evidence suggests that individuals 
predisposed towards positive outcomes choose to reside in enclave neighborhoods. 
4.3 Heterogeneity of effects
Not all ghettos have the same impact on their residents: this is the simple logical 
conclusion of existing research on the subject, which has found a combination of positive, 
negative, and null impacts.  Following previous work on the subject, the regression specifications 
in Table 7 test for a simple form of heterogeneity in the effect of dissimilarity and isolation on 
outcomes.  In this table, dependent variables appear in rows and each pair of columns represents 
a different regression specification.  The table reports OLS-fixed effect results and IV results 
pertaining to both the Dissimilarity and Isolation indices.  The first coefficient reported in each 
pair is the main effect of segregation, the second is the coefficient on the interaction of 
segregation with the average education level variable included as a covariate in earlier analyses. 
20The main effect can thus be interpreted as the impact of segregation on an immigrant group 
where the mean level of education is zero.  The interaction term identifies the change in the 
marginal impact of segregation associated with a one-year increase in average education levels. 
In IV specifications, both the main effect and interaction term are instrumented for, with the 
mean years-since-immigration variable and its interaction with mean education.
The OLS specifications in this case reveal very few significant patterns.  The two sets of 
results that do appear link the most positive impacts of segregation to the lowest-education 
groups.  These effects are significant only at the 10% level, and both are directly contradicted by 
evidence available in the corresponding IV specification.
In instrumental variables specifications, a fairly consistent result pattern emerges in the 
analysis of three dependent variables: English ability, single motherhood, and the logarithm of 
earned income.  Segregation, whether measured by dissimilarity or isolation, predicts worse 
outcomes for groups with the least education, and better outcomes for highly educated groups. 
Depending on the particular point estimates, the crossover from negative to positive segregation 
effects occurs at mean education levels between 10th grade and minimal post-secondary 
education.  Thus, isolation in an enclave where most adults have post-secondary degrees appears 
beneficial in many respects, while isolation in an enclave where most adults have education 
below minimum domestic standards appears harmful.
Table 8 presents results of analogous specifications that interact tract-level group share 
variables with group mean education levels, utilizing restricted-access Census microdata. 
Coefficients derived from OLS specifications with MSA and country-of-origin fixed effects, like 
their Table 7 counterparts, are generally inconclusive.  Interaction terms are insignificant in three 
21of four specifications, and main effects suggest widely varying impacts of ethnic concentration 
on outcomes for low-skilled immigrant groups.  As in the previous table, IV estimates present a 
more consistent picture.  In three of four specifications, neighborhood-level ethnic concentration 
displays a statistically significant moderated relationship with individual outcomes, with more 
negative effects occurring among groups with lower average education levels.  Among low 
skilled groups, ethnic concentration is associated with lower English fluency, lower earnings, 
and higher rates of idleness.  These associations weaken as the skill level of the group increases. 
Around the population average of 10 years of education, implied effects are close to zero in all 
cases.  These effects are generally consistent with the evidence derived from segregation indices 
presented in Table 7.
Overall, the results presented in this section indicate that the effects of ethnic 
concentration are dependent on the skill level of the group in question.  Moreover, the use of 
segregation indices as a summary measure of ethnic concentration produces the most reliable 
results in specifications that permit this form of effect heterogeneity.
5. Conclusions
Ghettos are neither monolithically good nor bad.  Existing literature points toward this 
conclusion, and the evidence presented in this paper supports it.  The total impact of residence in 
an ethnic enclave depends on the characteristics of the individuals who are isolated in it.  Groups 
with high average levels of human capital appear to benefit from segregation, while less-
educated communities suffer.
A second implication of this paper is that a study of the mean impact of segregation may 
provide a misleading estimate of the actual impact of residing in an enclave neighborhood. 
22While many estimates point towards a positive average impact of segregation on outcomes for 
immigrant groups in the United States, equivalent estimates focusing on neighborhood-level 
ethnic concentration reach the opposite conclusion.  Both estimates based on analysis of 
segregation and of actual neighborhood concentration support the conclusion that isolation is less 
harmful for more-skilled ethnic groups.
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24Table 1: Outcome Regression Descriptive Statistics, IPUMS 1990
Dependent Variables N Mean SD Min Max
English Ability 14137 0.953 — — —
School Enrollment 5637 0.791 — — —
Teen Mother 5636 0.068 — — —
Single Mother 14293 0.130 — — —
Wage Income (logged) 22564 9.166 0.988 0.693 12.185
Idle 30584 0.208 — — —
Covariates
Isolation 4101 0.006 0.017 0 0.234
Dissimilarity 4101 0.225 0.321 0 0.980
Immigrant Share 4101 0.002 0.010 0 0.228
Mean Age 4101 38.109 11.324 2 90
Mean Years in US 4101 974.87 8.098 949 990
Mean Education 4101 9.904 2.115 1 17
Entered 1987-1990 46831 0.239 — — —
1985-1986 46831 0.138 — — —
1982-1984 46831 0.136 — — —
1975-1981 46831 0.316 — — —
1960-1974 46831 0.171 — — —
Education 46831 8.367 3.458 1 17
Age 46831 21.706 5.916 9 30
Female 46831 0.471 — — —
Black 46831 0.070 — — —
Other Non-White 46831 0.754 — — —
25Table 2A: Dissimilarity and outcomes: OLS results
Independent variable English Ability
(age 9-18)
Enrollment
(age 16-18)
Single Mother
(age 20-30)
Teen Mother
(age 13-19)
ln(Earnings)
(age 20-30)
Idle
(age 20-30)
Dissimilarity index 0.001 0.106 0.048 -0.062 0.521** -0.034
(0.068) (0.191) (0.121) (0.061) (0.253) (0.085)
Group share of MSA population -0.399*** -0.549* -0.137 0.013 1.314*** -0.124
(0.077) (0.312) (0.231) (0.066) (0.267) (0.128)
Year of entry 1985-86 0.167*** 0.098*** 0.017** 0.028* 0.260*** -0.056***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.231) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005)
Year of entry 1982-84 0.232*** 0.227*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.259*** -0.073***
(0.030) (0.025) (0.013) (0.018) (0.009) (0.005)
Year of entry 1975-81 0.268*** 0.256*** 0.037*** 0.061*** 0.400*** -0.081***
(0.033) (0.012) (0.006) (0.015) (0.026) (0.006)
Year of entry 1960-74 0.263*** 0.259*** 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.542*** -0.111***
(0.032) (0.024) (0.006) (0.010) (0.025) (0.008)
Education 0.044*** 0.079*** -0.007** -0.022*** 0.030*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age -0.037*** -0.189*** 0.003** 0.055*** 0.040*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001)
Female 0.005** -0.009 — — -0.418*** 0.289***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.021) (0.021)
Black 0.056*** 0.072** 0.222*** 0.053 -0.124* 0.057
(0.016) (0.035) (0.026) (0.033) (0.069) (0.045)
Other Non White 0.023** 0.112*** 0.067** -0.001 -0.268*** 0.008
(0.011) (0.034) (0.029) (0.019) (0.058) (0.032)
Average age of group members in MSA 0.005*** 0.009*** -0.0003 -0.002** -0.011*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Average education of group members in 
MSA
0.006** 0.018* -0.021*** -0.016*** 0.061*** -0.019***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.016) (0.005)
R2 0.2435 0.3584 0.0179 0.0963 0.1430 0.1445
N 14137 5637 14293 5636 22564 30584
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to reflect within-immigrant-community clustering.  Sample consists of foreign-born Census 
respondents.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, * the 10% level.
26Table 2B: Isolation and outcomes: OLS results
Independent variable English Ability
(age 9-18)
Enrollment
(age 16-18)
Single Mother
(age 20-30)
Teen Mother
(age 13-19)
ln(Earnings)
(age 20-30)
Idle
(age 20-30)
Isolation index -0.138 -0.476 -0.025 0.005 1.393** -0.023
(0.147) (0.303) (0.291) (0.163) (0.551) (0.229)
Group share of MSA population -0.322*** -0.361 -0.152 0.058 0.157 -0.088
(0.108) (0.301) (0.311) (0.137) (0.417) (0.228)
Year of entry 1985-86 0.167*** 0.098*** 0.017** 0.028* 0.259*** -.056***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005)
Year of entry 1982-84 0.232*** 0.226*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.259*** -0.073***
(0.033) (0.025) (0.013) (0.018) (0.009) (0.005)
Year of entry 1975-81 0.268*** 0.254*** 0.038*** 0.061*** 0.400*** -0.081***
(0.033) (0.013) (0.006) (0.015) (0.026) (0.006)
Year of entry 1960-74 0.263*** 0.257*** 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.540*** -0.110***
(0.033) (0.025) (0.005) (0.010) (0.026) (0.008)
Education 0.044*** 0.079*** -0.007** -0.022*** 0.030*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age -0.037*** -0.188*** 0.003** 0.055*** 0.040*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001)
Female 0.005** -0.009* — — -0.418*** 0.289***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.021) (0.021)
Black 0.059*** 0.092*** 0.225*** 0.050 -0.121* 0.055
(0.014) (0.033) (0.026) (0.034) (0.069) (0.045)
Other Non White 0.028** 0.129*** 0.069** -0.001 -0.311*** 0.008
(0.012) (0.035) (0.029) (0.020) (0.059) (0.030)
Average age of group members in MSA 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.069** -0.002** -0.012*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.029) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Average education of group members in 
MSA
0.005 0.015 -0.0002 -0.016*** 0.073*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.002) (0.004) (0.018) (0.005)
R2 0.2436 0.3588 0.0178 0.0963 0.1435 0.1445
N 14137 5637 14293 5636 22564 30584
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to reflect within-immigrant-community clustering.  Sample consists of foreign-born Census 
respondents. 
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, * the 10% level.
27Table 3A: Dissimilarity and outcomes: Results with MSA and country-of-origin fixed effects
Independent variable English Ability
(age 9-18)
Enrollment
(age 16-18)
Single Mother
(age 20-30)
Teen Mother
(age 13-19)
ln(Earnings)
(age 20-30)
Idle
(age 20-30)
Dissimilarity index 0.017 -0.021 -0.035 0.041 -0.225* -0.064**
(0.036) (0.069) (0.046) (0.046) (0.120) (0.033)
Group share of MSA population -0.201*** 0.427*** 0.055 0.085 0.755*** -0.003
(0.071) (0.170) (0.180) (0.123) (0.293) (0.099)
Year of entry 1985-86 0.167*** 0.095*** 0.017** 0.028* 0.262**** -0.056***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016) (0.013) (0.005)
Year of entry 1982-84 0.232*** 0.220*** 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.263**** -0.072***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.015) (0.018) (0.010) ().005)
Year of entry 1975-81 0.269*** 0.254*** 0.037*** 0.062*** 0.406**** -0.081***
(0.033) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.021) (.006)
Year of entry 1960-74 0.265*** 0.267*** 0.057*** 0.066*** 0.548**** -0.113***
(0.031) (0.019) (0.005) (0.011) (0.023) (0.007)
Education 0.044*** 0.078*** -0.007** -0.022*** 0.031**** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Age -0.037*** -0.187*** 0.003** 0.055*** 0.041**** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.015) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001)
Female 0.006** -0.009 — — -0.417**** 0.298***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.022) (0.021)
Black 0.055** -0.058 0.187*** 0.092*** -0.055 0.046
(0.025) (0.048) (0.036) (0.035) (0.058) (0.030)
Other Non White -0.010 0.017 0.050** 0.011 -0.107 -0.030*
(0.023) (0.038) (0.019) (0.047) (0.186) (0.016)
Average age of group members in MSA -0.002** -0.004 -0.001 0.003* -0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
Average education of group members in MSA 0.004 0.008 -0.008 -0.009 0.032 -0.003
(0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.006)
R2
0.2468 0.3685 0.0264 0.0999 0.1499 0.1482
N 14137 5637 14293 5636 22564 30584
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to reflect within-immigrant-community clustering.  Sample consists of foreign-born Census 
respondents.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, * the 10% level.
28Table 3B: Isolation and outcomes: Results with MSA and country-of-origin fixed effects
Independent variable English Ability
(age 9-18)
Enrollment
(age 16-18)
Single Mother
(age 20-30)
Teen Mother
(age 13-19)
ln(Earnings)
(age 20-30)
Idle
(age 20-30)
Isolation index 0.232** -0.188 -0.268 -0.064 0.250 0.133
(0.107) (0.202) (0.178) (0.157) (0.512) (0.204)
Group share of MSA population -0.348*** 0.614*** 0.241 0.095 0.709 -0.053
(0.085) (0.195) (0.154) (0.122) (0.515) (0.161)
Year of entry 1985-86 0.167*** 0.095*** 0.017** 0.028* 0.262*** -0.056***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016) (0.013) (0.005)
Year of entry 1982-84 0.232*** 0.220*** 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.263*** -0.072***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.015) (0.018) (0.010) (0.005)
Year of entry 1975-81 0.269*** 0.254*** 0.037*** 0.062*** 0.406*** -0.080***
(0.033) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.021) (0.006)
Year of entry 1960-74 0.265*** 0.267*** 0.057*** 0.066*** 0.548*** -0.113***
(0.031) (0.019) (0.005) (0.011) (0.023) (0.007)
Education 0.044*** 0.078*** -0.007** -0.022*** 0.031*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Age -0.037*** -0.187*** 0.003** 0.055*** 0.041*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.015) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001)
Female 0.006** -0.009 — — -0.417*** 0.289***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.022) (0.021)
Black 0.055** -0.058 0.187*** 0.092*** -0.054 0.046
(0.025) (0.048) (0.036) (0.035) (0.058) (0.030)
Other Non White -0.010 0.017 0.050** 0.011 -0.108 -0.031*
(0.022) (0.038) (0.019) (0.047) (0.186) (0.016)
Average age of group members in MSA -0.002*** -0.004 -0.001 0.003* -0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
Average education of group members in MSA 0.009* 0.004 -0.013 -0.011 0.044* 0.002
(0.005) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0025) (0.006)
R2 0.2468 0.3685 0.0264 0.0999 0.1499 0.1482
N 14137 5637 14293 5636 22564 30584
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to reflect within-immigrant-community clustering.  Sample consists of foreign-born Census 
respondents.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, * the 10% level.
29Table 4A: Dissimilarity and outcomes: Results from Instrumental Variable specifications
Independent variable English Ability
(age 9-18)
Enrollment
(age 16-18)
Single Mother
(age 20-30)
Teen Mother
(age 13-19)
ln(Earnings)
(age 20-30)
Idle
(age 20-30)
Dissimilarity index 0.104** 0.067 0.035 0.008 0.371** 0.047
(0.045) (0.108) (0.052) (0.064) (0.170) (0.044)
Group share of MSA population -0.136* 0.555*** 0.090 0.064 1.062*** 0.058
(0.070) (0.195) (0.189) (0.125) (0.403) (0.116)
Year of entry 1985-86 0.167*** 0.095*** 0.017** 0.028* 0.263*** -0.056***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016) (0.013) (0.005)
Year of entry 1982-84 0.232*** 0.220*** 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.263*** -0.072***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.015) (0.018) (0.010) (0.005)
Year of entry 1975-81 0.269*** 0.254*** 0.037*** 0.062*** 0.406*** -0.080***
(0.033) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.021) (0.006)
Year of entry 1960-74 0.265*** 0.267*** 0.057*** 0.066*** 0.548*** -0.113***
(0.031) (0.019) (0.005) (0.011) (0.023) (0.007)
Education 0.044*** 0.078*** 0.003** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Age -0.037*** -0.187*** -0.007** -0.022*** 0.041*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Female 0.006** -0.009 — — -0.417*** 0.289***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.022) (0.021)
Black 0.054** -0.058 0.187*** 0.092*** -0.054 0.046
(0.025) (0.048) (0.036) (0.035) (0.058) (0.030)
Other Non White -0.011 0.016 0.050** 0.011 -0.109 -0.031*
(0.022) (0.038) (0.019) (0.047) (0.186) (0.16)
Average age of group members in MSA -0.001* -0.004 -0.001 0.003* -0.001 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007)
Average education of group members in MSA 0.007 0.010 -0.006 -0.010 0.047* 0.001
(0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.026) (0.001)
R2 0.2468 0.3684 0.0264 0.0999 0.1498 0.1482
N 14137 5637 14293 5636 22564 30584
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to reflect within-immigrant-community clustering.  Sample consists of foreign-born Census 
respondents.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, * the 10% level.
30Table 4B: Isolation and outcomes: Results from Instrumental Variable specifications
Independent variable English Ability
(age 9-18)
Enrollment
(age 16-18)
Single Mother
(age 20-30)
Teen Mother
(age 13-19)
ln(Earnings)
(age 20-30)
Idle
(age 20-30)
Isolation index 0.970** 0.506 0.283 0.059 2.963** 0.388
(0.402) (0.813) (0.416) (0.494) (1.525) (0.361)
Group share of MSA population -0.771*** 0.204 -0.106 0.026 -1.052 -0.218
(0.237) (0.495) (0.298) (0.316) (0.930) (0.254)
Year of entry 1985-86 0.167*** 0.095*** 0.017** 0.028* 0.262*** -0.056***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016) (0.013) (0.005)
Year of entry 1982-84 0.232*** 0.220*** 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.263*** -0.072***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.015) (0.018) (0.010) (0.005)
Year of entry 1975-81 0.269*** 0.254*** 0.037*** 0.062*** 0.406*** -0.080***
(0.033) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.021) (0.006)
Year of entry 1960-74 0.266*** 0.267*** 0.057*** 0.066*** 0.549*** -0.113***
(0.031) (0.019) (0.005) ()011) (0.023) (0.007)
Education 0.044*** 0.078*** 0.003** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Age -0.037*** -0.187*** -0.007** -0.022*** 0.041*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Female 0.006** -0.009 -0.417*** 0.289***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.022) (0.021)
Black 0.055** -0.058 0.187*** 0.092*** -0.055 0.046
(0.025) (0.048) (.036) (0.035) (0.058) (0.030)
Other Non White -0.011 0.017 0.050** 0.011 -0.111 -0.031*
(0.023) (0.038) (0.020) (0.047) (0.185) (0.016)
Average age of group members in MSA -0.003*** -0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
Average education of group members in MSA 0.027** 0.021 -0.00002 -0.008 0.111 0.008
(0.012) (0025) (0.015) (0.019) (0.047) (0.011)
R2 0.2467 0.3684 0.0263 0.0999 0.1497 0.1482
N 14137 5637 14293 5636 22564 30584
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to reflect within-immigrant-community clustering.  Sample consists of foreign-born Census 
respondents.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, * the 10% level.
31Table 5: Tract-level group share and outcomes: Results with MSA and country-of-origin fixed effects
Independent variable English Ability
(age 9-18)
Enrollment
(age 16-18)
ln(Earnings)
(age 20-30)
Idle
(age 20-30)
Group share of tract population -0.076***
(0.006)
0.038*** 
(0.006)
-0.195*** 0.048***
(0.033) (0.006)
Group share of MSA 
population
0.027
(0.024)
0.057 
(0.069)
0.199** -0.070**
(0.082) (0.033)
Year of entry 1985-86 0.180***
(0.017)
0.120*** 
(0.002)
0.274*** -0.052***
(0.011) (0.004)
Year of entry 1982-84 0.228***
(0.025)
0.186*** 
(0.008)
0.328*** -0.068***
(0.008) (0.005)
Year of entry 1980-81 0.241***
(0.023)
Year of entry 1975-79 0.273***
(0.023)
0.236***
(0.019)
0.257***
(0.012)
0.378*** -0.093***
(0.017)
0.444***
(0.020)
(0.003)
-0.098***
(0.003)
Year of entry 1970-74 0.278***
(0.023)
0.228**** 
(0.014)
0.504*** -0.098***
(0.026) (0.002)
Year of entry 1965-69 --- --- 0.592*** -0.094***
(0.029) (0.005)
Year of entry 1960-64 --- --- 0.713*** -0.095***
(0.042) (0.003)
Education 0.041***
(0.001)
0.079*** 
(0.003)
0.029*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.001)
Age -0.032***
(0.001)
-0.169*** 
(0.003)
0.043*** 0.002***
(0.005) (0.001)
Female -0.005***
(0.001)
-0.002 
(0.003)
-0.397*** 0.286***
(0.015) (0.018)
Black 0.011*
(0.007)
-0.006 
(0.016)
-0.025 0.025**
(0.046) (0.013)
Other Non White -0.026*
(0.016)
-0.033
(0.032)
-0.006 -0.007**
(0.024) (0.003)
Average age of group members 
in MSA
-0.00001
(0.0004)
-0.001 
(0.001)
-0.001 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Average education of group 
members in MSA
0.003*
(0.002)
0.018***
(0.006)
0.051*** -0.004
(0.012) (0.003)
R2 0.2242 0.3064 0.1452 0.1449
N 193,916 99,235 408,897 552,513
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to reflect within group/tract clustering.  Sample 
consists of foreign-born Census respondents.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, * the 10% level.
32Table 6: Tract-level group share and outcomes: Instrumental Variable specifications
Independent variable English Ability
(age 9-18)
Enrollment
(age 16-18)
ln(Earnings)
(age 20-30)
Idle
(age 20-30)
Group share of tract population -0.103***
(0.012)
0.030 
(0.020)
-0.274*** 0.003
(0.054) (0.027)
Group share of MSA 
population
0.055**
(0.026)
0.065 
(0.072)
0.199** -0.025
(0.082) (0.042)
Year of entry 1985-86 0.180***
(0.017)
0.120*** 
(0.002)
0.274*** -0.052***
(0.011) (0.004)
Year of entry 1982-84 0.228***
(0.025)
0.186*** 
(0.008)
0.328*** -0.068***
(0.008) (0.005)
Year of entry 1980-81 0.242***
(0.023)
Year of entry 1975-79 0.273***
(0.023)
0.236***
(0.019)
0.257***
(0.012)
0.378*** -0.093***
(0.017)
0.444***
(0.020)
(0.003)
-0.098***
(0.003)
Year of entry 1970-74 0.278***
(0.023)
0.228**** 
(0.014)
0.505*** -0.098***
(0.026) (0.003)
Year of entry 1965-69 --- --- 0.591*** -0.094***
(0.029) (0.005)
Year of entry 1960-64 --- --- 0.710*** -0.096***
(0.042) (0.004)
Education 0.041***
(0.001)
0.079*** 
(0.003)
0.029*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.001)
Age -0.032***
(0.001)
-0.169*** 
(0.003)
0.043*** 0.002***
(0.005) (0.001)
Female -0.005***
(0.001)
-0.002 
(0.003)
-0.397*** 0.286***
(0.015) (0.017)
Black 0.010*
(0.006)
-0.006 
(0.016)
-0.026 0.023**
(0.045) (0.012)
Other Non White -0.026
(0.016)
-0.033
(0.032)
-0.004 -0.005**
(0.023) (0.004)
Average age of group members 
in MSA
-0.000001
(0.0004)
-0.001 
(0.001)
-0.001 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Average education of group 
members in MSA
0.003*
(0.002)
0.018***
(0.006)
0.051*** -0.004
(0.012) (0.003)
R2 0.2241 0.3064 0.1451 0.1447
N 193,916 99,235 408,897 552,513
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to reflect within group/tract clustering.  Sample 
consists of foreign-born Census respondents.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, * the 10% level.
33Table 7: Testing for heterogeneity in the effects of segregation
Dependent 
variable
Dissimilarity Isolation
OLS/Fixed Effects IV OLS/Fixed Effects IV
Main effect Interaction Main effect Interaction Main effect Interaction Main effect Interaction
English 
Ability
0.207*
(0.109)
-0.021*
(0.012)
-0.254
(0.154)
0.041**
(0.018)
0.239
(0.448)
-0.001
(0.051)
-2.770**
(1.214)
0.350**
(0.138)
School 
Enrollment
-0.115
(0.333)
0.011
(0.036)
-0.208
(0.370)
0.033
(0.045)
0.852
(1.00)
-0.130
(0.116)
-1.950
(2.579)
0.239
(0.293)
Single 
Mother
0.112
(0.223)
-0.016
(0.021)
0.564**
(0.209)
-0.064**
(0.026)
0.939
(1.067)
-0.146
(0.121)
3.399**
(1.482)
-0.297*
(0.157)
Teen 
Mother
0.025
(0.200)
0.002
(0.022)
0.352
(0.266)
-0.041
(0.033)
-0.755
(0.886)
0.084
(0.099)
2.156
(1.968)
-0.205
(0.217)
ln(earnings) 0.216
(0.544)
-0.049
(0.058)
-1.571***
(0.589)
0.238***
(0.080)
2.965*
(1.600)
-0.331*
(0.183)
-14.021***
(5.212)
1.637***
(0.568)
Idle -0.099
(0.192)
0.004
(0.020)
-0.048
(0.141)
0.012
(0.017)
0.587
(0.840)
-0.055
(0.094)
-0.740
(0.920)
0.108
(0.102)
Note: Main effect is the coefficient on the relevant segregation index in each specification.  Interaction term is between segregation 
and the mean education level of immigrants of the same nationality within the same metropolitan area.  Standard errors, corrected 
for within MSA/group clustering, in parentheses.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, * the 10% level.
34Table 8: Testing for heterogeneity in the effect of tract share
Dependent 
variable
OLS/Fixed Effects IV
Main effect Interaction Main effect Interaction
English Ability -0.285***
(0.031)
0.038***
(0.006)
-0.234***
(0.012)
0.024***
(0.008)
School 
Enrollment
0.090*
(0.053)
-0.010
(0.010)
0.018
(0.073)
0.002
(0.012)
ln(earnings) -0.008
(0.168)
-0.034
(0.029)
-0.623***
(0.222)
0.063**
(0.032)
Idle 0.088**
(0.043)
-0.007
(0.008)
0.210*
(0.125)
-0.038**
(0.018)
Note: Main effect is the coefficient on the relevant segregation index in each specification. 
Interaction term is between segregation and the mean education level of immigrants of the 
same nationality within the same metropolitan area.  Standard errors, corrected for within-
tract/group clustering, in parentheses.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** the 5% level, * the 10% level.
35Figure 1: Dissimilarity and Isolation, 1910-2000.  Observations are weighted averages of statistics for immigrant 
communities, with weights equal to the number of immigrants in the community.
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Dissimilarity Index Isolation IndexAppendix Table A1: Representative first-stage regression equations
Dissimilarity Index Isolation Index Tract Share
Mean years since immigration for 
same MSA/country of origin cell
0.003
(1*10
-4)
4*10
-4
(2*10
-5)
---
Predicted share based on 
occupations
--- --- 38.27
(0.097)
Group share of MSA population -0.524
(0.011)
0.648
(0.004)
0.807
(0.011)
Mean age in MSA/country of 
origin cell
-0.026
(0.001)
0.001
(1*10
-4)
4*10
-4
(2*10
-4)
Mean education in MSA/country 
of origin cell
0.003
(1*10
-4)
-0.025
(3*10
-4)
0.003
(0.001)
Individual level covariates Yes Yes Yes
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 30,584 30,584 552,513
R
2 0.920 0.984 0.412
Note: These first-stage regressions correspond to two-stage specifications where the dependent 
variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent is idle.  Standard errors, corrected for 
within-MSA/group or within-tract/group clustering, in parentheses.
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